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Abstract In this paper, we discuss our research to-
wards developing special properties that introduce au-
tonomic behavior in pattern-recognition systems. In our
approach we use ASSL (Autonomic System Specifica-
tion Language) to formally develop such properties for
DMARF (Distributed Modular Audio Recognition Fra-
mework). These properties enhance DMARF with an
autonomic middleware that manages the four stages of
the framework’s pattern-recognition pipeline. DMARF
is a biologically inspired system employing pattern re-
cognition, signal processing, and natural language pro-
cessing helping us process audio, textual, or imagery
data needed by a variety of scientific applications, e.g.,
biometric applications. In that context, the notion go
autonomic DMARF (ADMARF) can be employed by
autonomous and robotic systems that theoretically re-
quire less-to-none human intervention other than data
collection for pattern analysis and observing the results.
In this article, we explain the ASSL specification mod-
els for the autonomic properties of DMARF.
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1 Introduction
Today, we face the challenge of hardware and software
complexity that appears to be the biggest threat to
the continuous progress in IT. Many initiatives towards
complexity reduction in both software and hardware
have arisen with the advent of new theories and para-
digms. Autonomic computing (AC) [13] promises re-
duction of the workload needed to maintain complex
systems by transforming them into self-managing au-
tonomic systems. The AC paradigm draws inspiration
from the human body’s autonomic nervous system [3].
The idea is that software systems can manage them-
selves and deal with dynamic requirements, as well as
unanticipated threats, automatically, just as the body
does, by handling complexity through self-management.
Pattern recognition is a widely used biologically in-
spired technique in the modern computer science. Al-
gorithms for image and voice recognition have been de-
rived from the human brain, which uses pattern recog-
nition to recognize shapes, images, voices, sounds, etc.
In this research, we applied the principles of AC to solve
specific problems in distributed pattern-recognition sys-
tems, such as availability, security, performance, etc.
where the health of a distributed pipeline is important.
We tackled these issues by introducing self-management
into the system behavior. As a proof-of-concept (PoC)
case study, we used ASSL [18,25] to develop the au-
tonomic self-management properties for DMARF [10],
which is an intrinsically complex pipelined distributed
system composed of multi-level operational layers. The
ASSL framework helped us develop the self-managing
features first, which we then integrated into DMARF.
In this paper, based on our results, we provide an at-
tempt to generalize our experience on any similar-scale
distributed pipelined pattern-recognition system.
21.1 Problem Statement and Proposed Solution
Distributed MARF (DMARF) could not be used in au-
tonomous systems of any kind as-is due to lack of pro-
vision for such a use by applications that necessitate
the self-management requirements. Extending DMARF
directly to support the said requirements is a major re-
design and development effort to undertake for an open-
source project. Moreover, such and extended autonomic
DMARF must be validated and tested, since there is no
immediate guarantee that the properties the latter has
been augmented with are intrinsically correct.
In our approach, we provide the methodology for the
initial proof-of-concept. We specify with ASSL a num-
ber of autonomic properties for DMARF, such as self-
healing [24], self-optimization [23], and self-protection
[12]. The implementation of those properties is gener-
ated automatically by the ASSL framework in the form
of a special wrapper Java code that provides an au-
tonomic layer implementing the DMARF’s autonomic
properties. In addition, the latter are formally validated
with the ASSL’s mechanisms for consistency and model
checking. Model checking is performed on the gener-
ated Java code, where the ASSL relies on the Java
PathFinder [2] tool developed by NASA Ames.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we briefly review the field of autonomic com-
puting and describe both ASSL and DMARF frame-
works. Section 3 presents details of the ASSL specifica-
tion models for autonomic properties of DMARF. Fi-
nally, Section 4 presents some concluding remarks and
future work.
2 Background
The vision and metaphor of AC [13] is to apply the
principles of self-regulation and complexity hiding. The
AC paradigm emphasizes reduction of the workload
needed to maintain complex systems by transforming
those into self-managing autonomic systems (AS). The
idea is that software systems shall automatically man-
age themselves just as the human body does. Nowadays,
a great deal of research effort is devoted to developing
AC tools. Such a tool is the ASSL framework, which
helps AC developers with problem specification, system
design, system analysis and evaluation, and system im-
plementation.
ASSL was initially developed by Vassev at Concor-
dia University, Montreal, Canada [25] and since then
it has been successfully applied to the development of
a variety of autonomic systems including distributed
ones. For example, ASSL was used to develop auto-
nomic features and generate prototype models for two
NASA missions – the ANTS (Autonomous Nano-Tech-
nology Swarm) concept mission (where a thousand of
picospacecraft work cooperatively to explore the aster-
oid belt [17]), and the Voyager mission [16]. In both
cases, there have been developed autonomic prototypes
to simulate the autonomic properties of the space explo-
ration missions and validate those properties through
the simulated experimental results. The targeted auto-
nomic properties were: self-configuring [22], self-healing
[19], and self-scheduling [21] for ANTS, and autonomic
image processing for Voyager [20]. In general, the de-
velopment of these properties required a two-level ap-
proach, i.e., they were specified at the individual space-
craft level and at the level of the entire system. Because
ANTS is intrinsically distributed system composed of
many autonomous spacecraft, that case study required
individual specification of the autonomic properties of
each individual spacecraft member of the ANTS swarm.
2.1 ASSL
The Autonomic System Specification Language (ASSL)
[18,25] approaches the problem of formal specification
and code generation of autonomic systems (ASs) within
a framework. The core of this framework is a special
formal notation and a toolset including tools that al-
low ASSL specifications be edited and validated. The
current validation approach in ASSL is a form of con-
sistency checking (handles syntax and consistency er-
rors) performed against a set of semantic definitions.
The latter form a theory that aids in the construction
of correct AS specifications. Moreover, from any valid
specification, ASSL can generate an operational Java
application skeleton.
Overall, ASSL considers autonomic systems (ASs)
as composed of autonomic elements (AEs) communicat-
ing over interaction protocols. To specify those, ASSL is
defined through formalization of tiers. Over these tiers,
ASSL provides a multi-tier specification model that is
designed to be scalable and exposes a judicious selec-
tion and configuration of infrastructure elements and
mechanisms needed by an AS. The ASSL tiers and their
sub-tiers (cf. Figure 1) are abstractions of different as-
pects of the AS under consideration. They aid not only
to specification of the system at different levels of ab-
straction, but also to reduction of the complexity, and
thus, to improving the overall perception of the system.
There are three major tiers (three major abstraction
perspectives), each composed of sub-tiers (cf. Figure 1):
– AS tier – presents a general and global AS perspec-
tive, where we define the general autonomic system
rules in terms of service-level objectives (SLO) and
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Fig. 1 ASSL Multi-Tier Model
self-management policies, architecture topology and
global actions, events and metrics applied in these
rules.
– AS Interaction Protocol (ASIP) tier – forms a com-
munication protocol perspective, where we define
the means of communication between AEs. An ASIP
is composed of channels, communication functions,
and messages.
– AE tier – forms a unit-level perspective, where we
define interacting sets of individual AEs with their
own behavior. This tier is composed of AE rules
(SLO and self-management policies), an AE inter-
action protocol (AEIP), AE friends (a list of AEs
forming a circle of trust), recovery protocols, spe-
cial behavior models and outcomes, AE actions, AE
events, and AE metrics.
The AS Tier specifies an AS in terms of service-level
objectives (AS SLOs), self-management policies, archi-
tecture topology, actions, events, and metrics (cf. Fig-
ure 1). The AS SLOs are a high-level form of behavioral
specification that help developers establish system ob-
jectives (e.g., performance). The self-management poli-
cies could be any of (but not restricted to) the four
so-called self-CHOP policies defined by the AC IBM
blueprint: self-configuring, self-healing, self-optimizing
and self-protecting [4]. These policies are event-driven
and trigger the execution of actions driving an AS in
critical situations. The metrics constitute a set of pa-
rameters and observables controllable by an AS. At the
ASIP Tier, the ASSL framework helps developers spec-
ify an AS-level interaction protocol as a public com-
munication interface, expressed with special communi-
cation channels, communication functions and commu-
nication messages. At the AE Tier, the ASSL formal
model exposes specification constructs for the specifi-
cation of the system’s AEs.
Conceptually, AEs are considered to be analogous to
software agents able to manage their own behavior and
their relationships with other AEs. These relationships
are specified at both ASIP and AEIP tiers. Whereas
ASIP specifies an AS-level interaction protocol that is
public and accessible to all the AEs of an AS and to ex-
ternal systems communicating with that very AS, the
AEIP tier is normally used to specify a private com-
munication protocol used by an AE to communicate
only with: 1) trusted AEs, i.e., AEs declared as “AE
Friends” (cf. Figure 1); and 2) special controlled man-
aged elements. Therefore, two AEs exchange messages
over an AEIP only if they are friends, thus revealing
the need for special negotiation messages specified at
ASIP to discover new friends at runtime.
Note that ASSL targets only the AC features of a
system and helps developers clearly distinguish the AC
features from the system-service features. This is possi-
ble, because with ASSL we model and generate special
AC wrappers in the form of ASs that embed the com-
ponents of non-AC systems. The latter are considered
as managed elements, controlled by the AS in question.
A managed element can be any software or hardware
system (or sub-system) providing services. Managed el-
ements are specified per AE (they form an extra layer
at the AEIP cf. Figure 1) where the emphasis is on the
control interface. It is important also to mention that
the ASSL tiers and sub-tiers are intended to specify
different aspects of an AS, but it is not necessary to
employ all of them in order to model such a system.
For a simple AS we need to specify 1) the AEs pro-
viding self-managing behavior intended to control the
managed elements associated with an AE; and 2) the
communication interface. Here, self-management poli-
cies must be specified to provide such self-managing
behavior at the level of AS (the AS Tier) and at the
level of AE (AE Tier). The self-management behav-
ior of an ASSL-developed AS is specified with the self-
management policies. These policies are specified with
special ASSL constructs termed fluents and mappings
[18,25]. A fluent is a state where an AS enters with
fluent-activating events and exits with fluent-terminat-
ing events. A mapping connects fluents with particu-
lar actions to be undertaken. Usually, an ASSL specifi-
cation is built around self-management policies, which
make that specification AC-driven. The policies them-
selves are driven by events and actions determined de-
terministically. Figure 2 presents a sample specification
of an ASSL self-healing policy.
4ASSELF MANAGEMENT {
SELF HEALING {
FLUENT inLosingSpacecraft {
INITIATED_BY { EVENTS.spaceCraftLost }
TERMINATED_BY { EVENTS.earthNotified }
}
MAPPING {
CONDITIONS { inLosingSpacecraft }
DO_ACTIONS { ACTIONS.notifyEarth }
}
}
} // ASSELF MANAGEMENT
Fig. 2 Self-management Policy
For more details on the ASSL multi-tier specifica-
tion model and the ASSL framework toolset, please re-
fer to [18,25].
2.2 Distributed MARF
DMARF [10] is based on the classical MARF whose
pipeline stages were made into distributed nodes. The
Modular Audio Recognition Framework (MARF) [5] is
an open-source research platform and a collection of
pattern recognition, signal processing, and natural lan-
guage processing (NLP) algorithms written in Java and
arranged into a modular and extensible framework fa-
cilitating addition of new algorithms for use and ex-
periments by scientists. MARF can run distributively
over the network, run stand-alone, or may just act as
a library in applications. MARF has a number of algo-
rithms implemented for various pattern recognition and
some signal processing tasks. The backbone of MARF
consists of pipeline stages that communicate with each
other to get the data they need in a chained manner.
In general, MARF’s pipeline of algorithm imple-
mentations is presented in Figure 3 (where the imple-
mented algorithms are grouped in white boxes, and the
stubs or in progress algorithms are grouped in gray).
The pipeline consists of the four core stages group-
ing the similar kinds of algorithms: (1) sample load-
ing, (2) preprocessing, (3) feature extraction, and (4)
training/classification. MARF’s distributed extension,
DMARF [10] allows the stages of the pipeline to run
as distributed nodes as well as a front-end. The ba-
sic stages and the front-end were implemented without
backup recovery or hot-swappable capabilities at this
point; just communication over Java RMI [26], CORBA
[14], and XML-RPC WebServices [15]. There is also
an undergoing project on the intensional scripting lan-
guage, MARFL [7] to allow scripting MARF tasks and
applications.
There are various applications that test and em-
ploy MARF’s functionality and serve as examples of
how to use MARF. High-volume processing of recorded
audio, textual, or imagery data are possible pattern-
recognition and biometric applications of DMARF. In
this work, most of the emphasis is on audio processing,
such as conference recordings with purpose of attribu-
tion of said material to identities of speakers. Another
emphasis is on processing a bulk of recorded phone con-
versations in a police department for forensic analysis
[8] and subject identification and classification. See the
cited works and references therein for more details on
MARF and applications.
3 Making Distributed Pipelined Systems
Autonomic with ASSL: Autonomic DMARF
Case Study
In general, ASSL helps to design and generate special
autonomic wrappers in the form of AEs that embed one
or more system components. The latter are considered
as managed elements (cf. Section 2.1) that present one
or more single nodes of a distributed system. There-
fore, for each distributed node, we ideally specify with
ASSL a single AE that introduces an autonomic behav-
ior to that node. All the AEs are specified at the AE
Tier and the global autonomic behavior of the entire
system is handled by specifications at the AS Tier (cf.
Figure 1). As shown in Section 2.1, we rely on a rich
set of constructs, such as actions, events, and metrics
to specify special self-management policies driving the
nodes of a distributed system in situations requiring
autonomic behavior. Moreover, with ASSL, we spec-
ify special interaction protocols (ASIP and AEIP) that
help those nodes exchange messages and synchronize on
common autonomic behavior. In this section we demon-
strate how ASSL may be applied to an inherently dis-
tributed system such as DMARF. The novelty in our
approach is safeguarding the distributed pipeline, which
is not possible with plain distributed systems. There-
fore, with this case study we not only demonstrate the
applicability of ASSL to distributed systems but also
validate that ASSL may successfully be applied to pipe-
lined distributed systems.
DMARF’s capture as an AS primarily covers the au-
tonomic behavior of the distributed pattern-recognition
pipeline. We examine properties that apply to DMARF
and specify in detail the self-CHOP aspects of it. If we
look a the DMARF pipeline as a whole, we see that
there should be at least one instance of every stage
somewhere on the network. There are four main core
pipeline stages and an application-specific stage that
initiates pipeline processing. If one of the core stages
goes offline, the pipeline stalls and to recover it has the
following options: 1) use of a replacement node; 2) re-
covery of the failed node; or 3) rerouting the pipeline
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through a different node with the same service func-
tionality as the failed one.
In order to make DMARF autonomic, we need to
add automicity (autonomic computing behavior) to the
DMARF behavior. We add a special autonomic man-
ager (AM) to each DMARF stage. This makes the lat-
ter AEs, those composing an autonomic DMARF (AD-
MARF ) capable of self-management.
3.1 Self-Healing
A DMARF-based system should be able to recover it-
self through replication to keep at least one route of
the pipeline available. There are two types of replica-
tion: 1) the replication of a service, which essentially
means that we increase the number of nodes per core
stage (e.g. two different hosts provide preprocessing ser-
vices as active replication, so if one goes down, the
pipeline is still not stalled; if both are up they can con-
tribute to load balancing, which is a part of the self-
optimization autonomic property); and 2) replication
within the node itself. If all nodes of a core stages go
down, the stage preceding it is responsible to start up
a temporary one on the host of the preceding stage, set
it up to repair the pipeline. This is the hard replica-
tion needed to withstand stall faults, where it is more
vulnerable and not fault-tolerant. In the second case,
denoting passive replication of the same node (or even
different nodes) losing a primary or a replica is not as
serious as in the first case because such a loss does not
produce a pipeline stall and it is easier to self-heal af-
ter a passive replica loss. Restart and recovery of the
failed node without replicas is another possibility for
self-healing for DMARF. Technically, it may be tried
prior or after the replica kicks in.
In the course of this project, we used ASSL to spec-
ify the self-healing behavior of ADMARF by address-
ing specific cases related to node replacement (service
replica) and node recovery, shown in Figure 4.
The following sub-sections describe the ASSL spec-
ification of the self-healing algorithm revealed here. We
specified this algorithm as an ASSL self-healing policy
spread on both system (AS tier) and autonomic element
(AE tier) levels where events, actions, metrics, and spe-
cial managed element interface functions are used to
incorporate the self-healing behavior in ADMARF (cf.
Appendix A). Note that due to space limitations Ap-
pendix A presents a partial ASSL specification where
only one AE (DMARF stage) is specified. The full spec-
ification specifies all the four DMARF stages.
3.1.1 AS Tier Specification for Self-Healing
At the AS tier we specify the global ADMARF self-
healing behavior. To specify the latter, we use an ASSL
SELF_HEALING self-management policy (cf. Figure 5).
61 ADMARF monitors its run-time performance and in case
of performance degradation notifies the problematic
DMARF stages to start self-healing;
2 Every notified DMARF stage (note that this is an AE)
analyzes the problem locally to determine its nature: a
node is down or a node is not healthy (does not perform
well);
3 if A node is down then
// The following node-replacement algorithm is
followed by the AM of the stage:
4 AM strives to find a replica note of the failed one;
5 if replica found then
6 next redirect computation to it;
7 end
8 if replica not found then
9 report the problem. Note that the algorithm
could be extended with a few more steps where
the AM contacts the AM of the previous stage to
organize pipeline reparation;
10 end
11 end
12 if A node does not perform well then
// The following node-recovery algorithm is
followed:
13 AM starts the recovery protocol for the problematic
node;
14 if recovery successful then
15 do nothing;
16 end
17 if recovery unsuccessful then
18 AM strives to find a replica node of the failed
one;
19 end
20 if replica found then
21 next redirect computation to it;
22 end
23 if replica not found then
24 report the problem;
25 end
26 end
Fig. 4 DMARF Self-Healing Algorithm
ASSELF MANAGEMENT {
SELF HEALING {
// a performance problem has been detected
FLUENT inLowPerformance {
INITIATED BY { EVENTS.lowPerformanceDetected }
TERMINATED BY { EVENTS.performanceNormalized,
EVENTS.performanceNormFailed }
}
MAPPING {
CONDITIONS { inLowPerformance }
DO ACTIONS { ACTIONS.startSelfHealing }
}
}
} // ASSELF MANAGEMENT
Fig. 5 AS Tier SELF HEALING Policy
Here we specified a single fluent mapped to an action
via a mapping.
Thus, the inLowPerformance fluent is initiated by
a lowPerformanceDetected event and terminated by
one of the events such as performanceNormalized or
ASSLO {
SLO performance {
FOREACH member in AES {
member.AESLO.performance
}
}
}
....
EVENTS { // these events are used in the fluents specification
EVENT lowPerformanceDetected {
ACTIVATION { DEGRADED { ASSLO.performance } } }
EVENT performanceNormalized {
ACTIVATION { NORMALIZED { ASSLO.performance } } }
EVENT performanceNormFailed {
ACTIVATION {
OCCURRED { AES.STAGE_AE.EVENTS.selfHealingFailed } } }
} // EVENTS
Fig. 6 AS Tier SLO and Events
performanceNormFailed. Here the inLowPerformance
event is activated when special AS-level performance
service-level objectives (SLO) degrade (cf. Figure 6).
Note that in ASSL, SLO are evaluated as Booleans
based on their satisfaction and thus, they can be evalu-
ated as degraded or normal [25]. Therefore, in our spec-
ification model, the lowPerformanceDetected event is
activated anytime when the ADMARF’s performance
goes down. Alternatively, the performanceNormalized
event activates when the same performance goes up.
As specified, the AS-level performance SLO are
a global task whose realization is distributed among
the AEs (DMARF stages). Thus, the AS-level perfor-
mance degrades when the performance of any of the
DMARF stages goes down (cf. the FOREACH loop in
Figure 6), thus triggering the SELF_HEALING policy. In
addition, the performanceNormFailed event activates
if an a special event (selfHealingFailed) occurs in
the system. This event is specified at the AE tier (cf.
Section 3.1.2) and reports that the local AE-level self-
healing has failed. Although not presented in this spec-
ification, the performanceNormFailed event should be
activated by any of the performanceNormFailed events
specified for each AE (a DMARF stage).
Moreover, once the inLowPerformance fluent gets
initiated, the corresponding startSelfHealing action
is executed (cf. Figure 6). This action simply triggers
an AE-level event if the performance of that AE is de-
graded. The AE-level event prompts the SELF_HEALING
policy at the AE level (cf. Section 3.1.2).
3.1.2 AE Tier Specification for Self-Healing
At this tier we specify the self-healing policy for each
AE in the ADMARF AS. Recall that the ADMARF
’s AEs are the DMARF stages enriched with a special
autonomic manager each.
Appendix A presents the self-healing specification
of one AE called STAGE_AE. Note that the latter can
7AESLO {
SLO performance {
METRICS.numberOfFailedNodes
AND
METRICS.numberOfProblematicNodes
}
}
Fig. 7 AE Tier SLO
VALUE { 0 }
THRESHOLD CLASS { Integer [0] } // valid only when holds 0
Fig. 8 AE Tier Metric Threshold Class
be considered as a generic AE and the specifications
of the four AEs (one per DMARF stage) can be de-
rived from this one. Similar to the AS-level specifica-
tion (cf. Section 3.1.1), here we specify a (but AE-level)
SELF_HEALING policy with a set of fluents initiated and
terminated by events and actions mapped to those flu-
ents (cf. Appendix A). Thus we specified three distinct
fluents: inActiveSelfHealing, inFailedNodesDetec-
ted, and inProblematicNodesDetected, each mapped
to an AE-level action. The first fluent gets initiated
when a mustDoSelfHealing event occurs in the system.
That event is triggered by the AS-level startSelfHea-
ling action in the case when the performance SLO of
the AE get degraded (cf. Appendix A).
Here the performance SLO of the AE are specified
as a Boolean expression over two ASSL metrics, such as
the numberOfFailedNodes metric and the equivalent
numberOfProblematicNodes (cf. Figure 7). Whereas
the former measures the number of failed notes in the
DMARF stage, the latter measures the number of prob-
lematic nodes in that stage.
Both metrics are specified as RESOURCE metrics, i.e.,
observing a managed resource controlled by the AE
[25]. Note that the managed resource is the DMARF
stage itself. Thus, as those metrics are specified (cf. Ap-
pendix A) they get updated by the DMARF stage via
special interface functions embedded in the specifica-
tion of a STAGE_ME managed element (cf. Appendix A).
In addition, both metrics are set to accept only a zero
value (cf. Figure 8), thus set in the so-called metric
THRESHOLD_CLASS [25]. The latter determines rules for
valid and invalid metric values. Since in ASSL met-
rics are evaluated as Booleans (valid or invalid) based
on the value they are currently holding, the perfor-
mance SLO (cf. Figure 7) gets degraded if one of the
two defined metrics, the numberOf-FailedNodes met-
ric or the numberOfProblematicNodes metric become
invalid, i.e., if the DMARF stage reports that there is
one or more failed or problematic nodes.
// runs the replica of a failed node
INTERFACE_FUNCTION runNodeReplica {
PARAMETERS { DMARFNode node }
ONERR TRIGGERS { EVENTS.nodeReplicaFailed }
}
// recovers a problematic node
INTERFACE_FUNCTION recoverNode {
PARAMETERS { DMARFNode node }
ONERR TRIGGERS { EVENTS.nodeCannotBeFixed }
}
Fig. 9 AE Tier STAGE ME Functions
EVENT mustSwitchToNodeReplica {
ACTIVATION {
OCCURRED { EVENTS.nodeCannotBeFixed }
}
}
Fig. 10 Event mustSwitchToNodeReplica
The inActiveSelfHealing fluent prompts the ana-
lyzeProblem action execution (cf. Appendix A). The
latter uses the STAGE_ME managed element’s interface
functions to determine the nature of the problem – is it
a node that failed or it is a node that does not perform
well. Based on this, the action triggers a mustSwitch-
ToNodeReplica event or a mustFixNode event respec-
tively. Each one of those events initiates a fluent in the
AE SELF_HEALING policy to handle the performance
problem. The inFailedNodesDetected fluent handles
the case when a node has failed and its replica must be
started and the inProblematicNodesDetected fluent
handles the case when a node must be recovered. Here
the first fluent prompts the execution of the start-
ReplicaNode action and the second prompts the ex-
ecution of the fixProblematicNode action. Internally,
both actions call interface functions of the STAGE_ME
managed element. Note that those functions trigger er-
roneous events if they do not succeed (cf. Figure 9).
Those events terminate fluents of the AE SELF_HEALING
policy (cf. Appendix A).
It is important to mention that the inFailedNodes-
Detected fluent gets initiated when the mustSwitchTo-
NodeReplica event occurs in the system. The latter is
triggered by the analyzeProblem action.
Moreover, the same event activates, according to its
specification (cf. Figure 10), if a nodeCannotBeFixed
event occurs in the system, which is due to the inabil-
ity of the recoverNode interface function to recover the
problematic node (cf. Figure 9). Therefore, if a node
cannot be recovered the inFailedNodesDetected flu-
ent will be initiated in an attempt to start the replica of
that node. Note that this conforms to the self-healing
algorithm presented in Section 3.
83.2 ASSL Self-Protection Model for DMARF
For scientific and research computing on a local net-
work in a controlled lab environment, runs of DMARF
do not need to be protected against malicious alter-
ation or denial of service. However, as soon as the re-
searchers across universities need to cooperate (or po-
lice departments to share the audio data recognition or
computing), various needs about security and protec-
tion arise about data and computation results integrity,
confidentiality, and the fact they come from a legitimate
source. Therefore, self-protection of a DMARF-based
system is less important in the localized scientific en-
vironments, but is a lot more important in global en-
vironments ran over the Internet, potentially through
links crossing country borders. This is even more true
if the data being worked on by a DMARF installation
are of a sensitive nature such as recordings of the phone
conversations of potential terrorist suspects. Thus, we
point out the general requirements for this autonomic
property of DMARF:
– For the self-protection aspect, the DMARF-based
systems should adhere to the specification where
each node proves its identity to other nodes par-
ticipating in the pipeline as well as passive repli-
cas. This will insure the data origin authentication
(the data are coming from a legitimate source) and
will protect against spoofing of the data with dis-
torted voice recordings or incorrect processed data
at the later stages of the pipeline. Thus, we ensure
the trustworthiness of the distributed data being
processed [6]. This can be achieved by proxy cer-
tificates issued to the nodes during the deployment
and management phase. Each node digitally signs
the outgoing data, with the signature the recipient
node can verify through the certificate of the sender
signed by trusted authority. This is in a way similar
to how DNSSec [1] operates for the DNS names and
servers by attaching a public key to the host and IP
pair signed by the higher-level domain or authority.
The similar trust mechanism is also important when
DMARF is used for scientific research installation
that say crosses the boundaries of several Univer-
sities’ network perimeters over the Internet while
performing scientific computation – the bottom line
the data coming from the pipeline stages should be
trustworthy, i.e. correct.
– The same proxy certificates can also help with the
data privacy along public channels, especially when
identities of real people are involved, such as speak-
ers, that cross the Internet. The system should pro-
tect itself from any falsification attempt by detect-
ing it, halting the corresponding computation, and
logging and reporting the incident in a trustworthy
manner.
– Run-time communication protocol selection is a self-
protection option that ensures availability in case
the default communication mechanism becomes un-
available (e.g. the default port of rmiregistry be-
comes blocked by a firewall) the participating nodes
switch to XML-RPC over HTTP. The protection of
self against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
is a difficult problem, which extends onto protect-
ing not only self to the best available means but
also the self’s peers by avoiding flooding them by
the self’s own output of a compromised node. While
the DDoS attacks are very difficult to mitigate if a
node is under attack, each node can protect self and
others by limiting the amount of outgoing traffic it,
itself, produces when a compromise is suspected or
too much traffic flood is detected.
For self-protection, DMARF-based systems should
adhere to the specification where each node proves its
identity to other nodes participating in the pipeline as
well as passive replicas. This will insure the data origin
authentication (the data are coming from a legitimate
source) and will protect against spoofing of the data
with distorted voice recordings or incorrect processed
data at the later stages of the pipeline. Thus, we ensure
the trustworthiness of the distributed data being pro-
cessed [6]. This can be achieved by proxy certificates
issued to the nodes during the deployment and man-
agement phase. Each node digitally signs the outgoing
data, with the signature the recipient node can verify
through the certificate of the sender signed by trusted
authority. This is in a way similar to how DNSSec [1]
operates for the DNS names and servers by attaching a
public key to the host and IP pair signed by the higher-
level domain or authority. The same proxy certificates
can also help with the data privacy along public chan-
nels, especially when identities of real people are in-
volved, such as speakers, that cross the Internet. The
system should protect itself from any falsification at-
tempt by detecting it, halting the corresponding com-
putation, and logging and reporting the incident in a
trustworthy manner.
To provide self-protecting capabilities, DMARF has
to incorporate special autonomic computing behavior.
To achieve that, similar to our related work on the self-
healing and self-optimization models for DMARF [23,
24], we add a special autonomic manager (AM) to each
DMARF stage. This converts the latter into AEs that
compose the autonomic DMARF (ADMARF ) capable
of self-management. Self-protecting is one of the self-
management properties that must be addressed by AD-
MARF . Here we use ASSL to specify the self-protecting
9behavior of ADMARF where incoming messages must
be secure in order to be able to process them. Thus, if
a message (public or private) is about to be received
in the AS, the following self-protection algorithm is fol-
lowed by the AM of the stage (AE level) for private
messages or by the global AM (AS level) for public
messages:
– A message hook mechanism detects when a message
(public or private) is about to be received.
– AM strives to identify the sender of that message
by checking the embedded digital signature:
– If the message does not carry a digital signature
then it is considered insecure.
– If the message carries a digital signature then its
digital signature is checked:
• If the digital signature is recognized then the
message is considered secure.
• If the digital signature is not recognized then
the message is considered insecure.
– If the message is secure no restrictions are imposed
over the IO operations and the message can be pro-
cessed further.
– If the message is insecure the message is simply dis-
carded by blocking any IO operations over that mes-
sage.
The following sections describe the DMARF speci-
fication of the self-protecting algorithm revealed here.
We specified this algorithm as an ASSL self-protecting
policy spread on both system (AS tier) and autonomic
element (AE tier) levels where events, actions, metrics,
and special managed element interface functions are
used to incorporate the self-protecting behavior in AD-
MARF (cf. Appendix B). In addition, two interaction
protocols – a public (ASIP tier) and a private (AEIP
tier), are specified to provide a secure communication
system used by both DMARF nodes and external en-
tities to communicate. Note that due to space limita-
tions Appendix B presents a partial ASSL specification
where only one AE (DMARF stage) is specified. The
full specification specifies all the four DMARF stages.
3.2.1 IP Tiers Specification
Recall that ASSL specifies AEs as entities communi-
cating via special interaction protocols (cf. Section 2.1).
Note that all the communication activities (sending and
receiving messages), all the communication channels,
and all the communication entities (ASSL messages)
must be specified in order to allow both internal and
external entities to communicate. Hence, no entity can
either send or receive a message that is not an ASSL-
specified message or use alternative mechanism of com-
munication. Thus, for the needs of the self-protecting
//receive public messages if the message is secure
FUNCTION receivePublicMessages {
DOES {
IF ( AS.METRICS.thereIsInsecurePublicMessage ) THEN
MESSAGES.publicMessage << CHANNELS.publicLink
END
}
}
Fig. 11 ASSL Specification of receivePublicMessages
mechanism, we specified two communication protocols
– at the ASIP tier and at the AEIP tier (this is nested in
the AE specification structure) (cf. Section 2.1). Please
refer to Appendix B for a complete specification of both
protocols.
At the ASIP tier, we specified a single public mes-
sage (called publicMessage), a single sequential bidi-
rectional public communication channel (called public-
Link), and two public communication functions; specif-
ically receivePublicMessages and sendPublicMessa-
ges. They are specified to receive and send public mes-
sages over the public channel. Here any message sent
or received must be an instance of the ASSL-specified
publicMessage. The latter has an embedded Proxy-
Certificate parameter specified to carry the digital
signature of the message sender (cf. Appendix B). This
parameter plays a key role in the self-protecting behav-
ior of ADMARF . Every message sender must complete
this parameter with its proxy certificate before sending
the message or the latter will be discarded by the sys-
tem.
Moreover, the mentioned communication functions
(receivePublicMessages and sendPublicMessages)
are the only ones specified in the entire AS able to pro-
cess instances of the publicMessage ASSL message.
Thus, to process such a message both functions are
equipped with a conditional clause to check if the mes-
sage is secure (cf. Figure 11).
Figure 11 shows the receivePublicMessages com-
munication function. As is depicted, in order to send
a public message the thereIsInsecurePublicMessage
metric (cf. Appendix B) must be valid. The latter is
updated by the self-protecting policy and is considered
invalid (its operational evaluation returns FALSE [25])
if the public message to be received is insecure.
Note that the specification of the AEIP tier is iden-
tical to that of the ASIP tier (cf. Appendix B), but
deals with private messages [25], i.e., external entities
cannot send or receive such messages.
3.2.2 AS Tier Specification for Self-Protection
To protect the AS from insecure public messages we
specified a self-management policy that handles the ver-
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SELF_PROTECTING {
// a new incoming message has been detected
FLUENT inSecurityCheck {
INITIATED_BY { EVENTS.publicMessageIsComing }
TERMINATED_BY { EVENTS.publicMessageSecure,
EVENTS.publicMessageInsecure }
}
MAPPING {
CONDITIONS { inSecurityCheck }
DO_ACTIONS { ACTIONS.checkPublicMessage }
}
}
Fig. 12 AS Tier SELF PROTECTING Policy
EVENTS { //these events are used in the fluents specification
EVENT publicMessageIsComing {
ACTIVATION { SENT { ASIP.MESSAGES.publicMessage } }
}
EVENT publicMessageInsecure {
GUARDS { NOT METRICS.thereIsInsecurePublicMessage }
ACTIVATION {
CHANGED { METRICS.thereIsInsecurePublicMessage } }
}
EVENT publicMessageSecure {
GUARDS { METRICS.thereIsInsecurePublicMessage }
ACTIVATION {
CHANGED { METRICS.thereIsInsecurePublicMessage } }
}
} // EVENTS
Fig. 13 AS Tier Events
ification of any incoming public message. Thus, at this
tier we specify a SELF_PROTECTING policy (one of the
four self-CHOP policies [13]) to ensure protection from
insecure public messages. Here we specified a single flu-
ent mapped to an action via a mapping clause (cf. Fig-
ure 12).
The inSecurityCheck fluent is initiated by a pub-
licMessageIsComing event and is terminated by one of
the events, such as publicMessageSecure or public-
MessageInsecure. Here the inSecurityCheck fluent
is activated when an instance of the ASIP-specified
publicMessage is sent to a recipient in the AS. Recall
that any public message to be sent to a system recipient
(e.g., a DMARF node) must be an instance of the ASSL
publicMessage message (cf. Section 3.2.1). Therefore,
in our specification model, the publicMessageSecure
event will be activated anytime when a publicMessage
is about to be received by the AS (by a recipient in that
AS).
Figure 13 presents the specification of all the three
events used to initiate and terminate the inSecurity-
Check fluent. As it is depicted, both publicMessageIn-
secure and publicMessageSecure are prompted when
thereIsInsecurePublicMessage’s value has changed.
Special GUARDS are specified to prevent those events be
prompted when that metric is valid or not valid re-
spectively [25]. The corresponding metric thereIsIn-
securePublicMessage accepts only Boolean values and
is valid when it holds FALSE. The same metric is set
senderIdentified = false;
FOREACH member in AES {
IF ( NOT senderIdentified ) THEN
senderIdentified =
call member.ACTIONS.checkSenderCertificate
(ASIP.MESSAGES.publicMessage.senderSignature)
END
};
IF NOT senderIdentified THEN
// makes the metric invalid and thus, triggers the attached
// event and blocks all the operations with public messages
set METRICS.thereIsInsecurePublicMessage.VALUE = true
END
Fig. 14 AS checkPublicMessage Action – Partial Specification
to TRUE or FALSE by the checkPublicMessage action.
Here the metric is set to TRUE anytime when a new
public insecure message has been discovered (cf. Ap-
pendix B).
The checkPublicMessage action is mapped to the
inSecurityCheck fluent (cf. Figure 12). Here this ac-
tion is performed anytime when the AS enters in a secu-
rity check state (determined by the inSecurityCheck
fluent). This action is intended to check how secure is
the incoming publicMessage, which triggers the self-
protecting policy by prompting the publicMessageIs-
Coming event (cf. Figure 13). To do that, the checkPub-
licMessage action calls for each AE in the AS a check-
SenderCertificate action that must be specified in
each AE (DMARF stage) (cf. Figure 14).
The checkSenderCertificate action returns TRUE
if the publicMessage carries a valid digital signature
(cf. Appendix B), i.e., the message is sent by a trusted
sender (DMARF node). As depicted by Figure 14, if
one of the AE returns TRUE, then the publicMessage
is considered secure; otherwise, it is considered insecure.
If the message is insecure the thereIsInsecurePublic-
Message metric is set to TRUE, which blocks the IO op-
erations over this message (cf. Section 3.2.1 and Ap-
pendix B).
3.2.3 AE Tier Specification for Self-Protection
At this tier we specify the self-protecting mechanism for
private messages. Thus, for each AE (DMARF stage)
we specify a SELF_PROTECTING self-management policy
identical to the same policy specified at the AS tier (cf.
Section 3.2.2). Note that this policy deals with private
messages specified at the AEIP tier (the AE’s private
interaction protocol – cf. Appendix B).
Therefore, similarly to the same policy specified for
the AS tier, the AE-level SELF_PROTECTING policy is
specified with a single inSecurityCheck fluent mapped
to a checkPrivateMessage action. The inSecurity-
Check fluent is initiated by the privateMessageIsCo-
mming event and terminated by the privateMessageIs-
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MANAGED_ELEMENTS {
MANAGED_ELEMENT STAGE_ME {
// checks if a node certificate is valid
INTERFACE_FUNCTION checkNodeCertificate {
PARAMETERS { ProxyCertificate theCertificate }
RETURNS { Boolean }
}
}
}
Fig. 15 AE STAGE ME Managed Element
Secure event or by the privateMessageSecure event.
These events are similar to their homologous events
specified at the AS tier (cf. Section 3.2.2), but dealing
with the AEIP-specified privateMessage message and
with the thereIsInsecurePrivateMessage metric at
the AE-level (cf. Appendix B).
To perform the security checks of incoming private
messages, the checkPrivateMessage action invokes the
checkSenderCertificate action (recall that the same
action is called by the checkPublicMessage action to
check public messages – cf. Section 3.2.2). Internally,
the checkSenderCertificate action calls a managed
element interface function specified at the AEIP proto-
col to check proxy certificates (cf. Figure 15).
Recall (cf. Section 2.1) that managed elements pro-
vide special interface functions to control the DMARF
system. Hence, as depicted by Figure 15, we expect the
DMARF stage to verify whether a specific proxy cer-
tificate is valid and to return TRUE or FALSE. DMARF
does that through the Java Data Security Framework
(JDSF) [9,11].
3.3 ASSL Self-Optimization Model for DMARF
The two major functional requirements applicable to
large DMARF installations related to self-optimization
are outlined below:
Training set classification data replication. A DMARF-
based system may do a lot of multimedia data process-
ing and number crunching throughout the pipeline. The
bulk of I/O-bound data processing falls on the sam-
ple loading stage and the classification stage. The pre-
processing, feature extraction, and classification stages
also do a lot of CPU-bound number crunching, ma-
trix operations, and other potentially heavy computa-
tions. The stand-alone local MARF instance employs
dynamic programming to cache intermediate results,
usually as feature vectors, inverse co-variance matrices,
and other array-like data. A lot of this data is absorbed
by the classification stages. In the case of the DMARF,
such data may end up being stored on different hosts
that run the classification service potentially causing
re-computation of the already computed data on other
classification host that did a similar evaluation already.
Thus, the classification stage nodes need to commu-
nicate to exchange the data they have lazily acquired
among all the classification members. Such data mirror-
ing/replication would optimize a lot of computational
effort on the end nodes.
Dynamic communication protocol selection. Additional
aspect of self-optimization is automatic selection of the
available most efficient communication protocol. E.g.,
if DMARF initially uses WebServices XML-RPC and
later discovers all of its nodes can also communicate
using say Java RMI, they can switch to that as their
default protocol in order to avoid marshaling and de-
marshaling heavy SOAP XML messages that are always
a subject of a big overhead even in the compressed form.
Here, the DMARF Classification stage is augmented
with a self-optimizing autonomic policy. We used ASSL
to specify this policy and generate implementation for
the same. Appendix C presents a partial specification
of the ASSL self-optimization model for ADMARF. As
specified, the autonomic behavior is encoded in a spe-
cial ASSL construct denoted as SELF_OPTIMIZING pol-
icy. The latter is specified at two levels - the global
AS-tier level and the level of single AE (the AE-tier).
The algorithm behind is described by the following el-
ements:
– Any time when ADMARF enters in the Classifica-
tion stage, a self-optimization behavior takes place.
– The Classification stage itself forces the stage nodes
synchronize their latest cached results. Here each
node is asked to get the results of the other nodes.
– Before proceeding with the problem computation,
each stage node strives to adapt to the most efficient
currently available communication protocol.
The following sections describe the ASSL specifica-
tion of the self-optimization algorithm revealed here.
3.3.1 AS Tier Specification for Self-Optimization
At this tier we specify a system-level SELF_OPTIMIZING
policy and the actions and events supporting that pol-
icy. As was mentioned, ASSL supports policy specifica-
tion with special constructs called fluents and mappings
[25]. Whereas the former are special states with condi-
tional duration, the latter map actions to be executed
when the system enters in such a state.
Figure 16 depicts the AS-tier specification of the
SELF_OPTIMIZING policy. As we see the policy is trig-
gered when the special fluent inClassificationStage
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SELF_OPTIMIZING {
// DMARF enters in the Classification Stage
FLUENT inClassificationStage {
INITIATED_BY { EVENTS.enteringClassificationStage }
TERMINATED_BY { EVENTS.optimizationSucceeded,
EVENTS.optimizationNotSucceeded }
}
MAPPING {
CONDITIONS { inClassificationStage }
DO_ACTIONS { ACTIONS.runGlobalOptimization }
}
}
Fig. 16 AS Tier SELF OPTIMIZING Policy
is initiated. Here when ADMARF enters the Classifica-
tion stage in its pipeline, an AS-level enteringClassi-
ficationStage event is prompted to initiate the cor-
responding inClassificationStage fluent.
Further, this fluent is mapped to an AS-level run-
GlobalOptimization action (cf. Appendix C). This ac-
tion iterates over all the Classification stage nodes spec-
ified as distinct AEs (cf. Section 3.3.2) and calls for each
node a special AE-level synchronizeResults action
(cf. Appendix C). In case of exception, the optimizati-
onNotSucceeded event is issued; else the optimizati-
onSucceeded event is issued. Both events terminate the
inClassificationStage fluent, and consecutively AD-
MARF exits the SELF_OPTIMIZING policy.
To distinguish the AEs from the other AEs in AD-
MARF, we specified the architecture topology of the
system. For this we used the ASARCHITECTURE ASSL
construct [25]. Appendix C presents the specification
of the ADMARF architecture topology. Note that this
is a partial specification depicting only two AEs. The
full ASARCHITECTURE specification includes all the AEs
of ADMARF. As depicted, we specified a special group
of AEs called CLASSF_STAGE with members all the AEs
representing the Classification stage nodes. This group
allows the runGlobalOptimization action iterates over
the stage nodes.
3.3.2 AE Tier Specification for Self-Optimization
At this tier we specified the SELF_OPTIMIZING policy
for the Classification stage nodes. Here we specified for
every node a distinct AE. (cf. Appendix C) presents
the partial specification of two AEs, each representing
a single node of the Specification stage. At this level,
self-optimization concentrates on adapting the single
nodes to the most efficient communication protocol.
Similar to the AS-level policy specification (cf. Sec-
tion 3.3.1), an inCPAdaptation fluent is specified to
trigger such adaptation when ADMARF enters in the
Specification stage. This fluent is initiated by the AS-
level enteringClassificationStage event.
The same fluent is mapped to an adaptCP action
to perform the needed adaptation. This action is speci-
fied as IMPL, i.e., requiring further implementation [25].
In ASSL, we specify IMPL actions to hide complexity
via abstraction. Here, the adaptCP action is a complex
structure, which explanation is beyond the scope of this
paper. Therefore, we abstracted the specification of this
action (through IMPL) and provided only the prerequi-
site guard conditions and prompted events.
4 Conclusion
In this article, we have presented ASSL specification
models for autonomic features of ADMARF. To de-
velop these features, we devised algorithms with ASSL
for the pipelined stages of the DMARF’s pattern re-
cognition pipeline. The autonomic features were spec-
ified as special self-managing policies for self-healing,
self-protecting, and self-optimizing in ADMARF. The
ADMARF system (upon completion of the open-source
implementation) will be able to fully function in au-
tonomous environments, be those on the Internet, large
multimedia processing farms, robotic spacecraft that do
their own analysis, or simply even pattern-recognition
research groups that can rely more on the availability
of their systems that run for multiple days, unattended.
Although not a fully complete specification model for
ADMARF, we have attempted to provide didactic ev-
idence of how ASSL can help us achieve desired au-
tomicity in DMARF.
Future work is concerned with further ADMARF
development by including new autonomic features. For
example, together with the full implementation and
testing of the presented specification models, we in-
tend to develop autonomic features covering the self-
configuration aspects of ADMARF. These will help to
construct an intelligent ADMARF system able to re-
act automatically to dynamic requirements by finding
possible solutions and applying those with no human
interaction.
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A ASSL Specification of DMARF Self-Healing
// ASSL self-healing specification model for DMARF
AS DMARF {
TYPES { DMARFNode }
ASSLO {
SLO performance {....}
}
ASSELF_MANAGEMENT {
SELF_HEALING {....}
} // ASSELF_MANAGEMENT
ACTIONS {
ACTION IMPL startSelfHealing {
GUARDS { ASSELF_MANAGEMENT.SELF_HEALING.inLowPerformance }
TRIGGERS {
IF NOT AES.STAGE_AE.AESLO.performance THEN
AES.STAGE_AE.EVENTS.mustDoSelfHealing
END
}
}
} // ACTIONS
EVENTS { // these events are used in the fluents specification
EVENT lowPerformanceDetected { .... }
EVENT performanceNormalized { .... }
EVENT performanceNormFailed { .... }
} // EVENTS
} // AS DMARF
AES {
AE STAGE_AE {
VARS { DMARFNode nodeToRecover }
AESLO {
SLO performance {....}
}
AESELF_MANAGEMENT {
SELF_HEALING {
FLUENT inActiveSelfHealing {
INITIATED_BY { EVENTS.mustDoSelfHealing }
TERMINATED_BY { EVENTS.selfHealingSuccessful,
EVENTS.selfHealingFailed }
}
FLUENT inFailedNodesDetected {
INITIATED_BY { EVENTS.mustSwitchToNodeReplica }
TERMINATED_BY { EVENTS.nodeReplicaStarted,
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EVENTS.nodeReplicaFailed }
}
FLUENT inProblematicNodesDetected {
INITIATED_BY { EVENTS.mustFixNode }
TERMINATED_BY { EVENTS.nodeFixed,
EVENTS.nodeCannotBeFixed }
}
MAPPING {
CONDITIONS { inActiveSelfHealing }
DO_ACTIONS { ACTIONS.analyzeProblem }
}
MAPPING {
CONDITIONS { inFailedNodesDetected }
DO_ACTIONS { ACTIONS.startReplicaNode }
}
MAPPING {
CONDITIONS { inProblematicNodesDetected }
DO_ACTIONS { ACTIONS.fixProblematicNode }
}
}
} // AESELF_MANAGEMENT
AEIP {
MANAGED_ELEMENTS {
MANAGED_ELEMENT STAGE_ME {
INTERFACE_FUNCTION countFailedNodes {....}
INTERFACE_FUNCTION countProblematicNodes {....}
// returns the next failed node
INTERFACE_FUNCTION getFailedNode {....}
// returns the next problematic node
INTERFACE_FUNCTION getProblematicNode {....}
// runs the replica of a failed nodee
INTERFACE_FUNCTION runNodeReplica {....}
// recovers a problematic node
INTERFACE_FUNCTION recoverNode {....}
}
}
} // AEIP
ACTIONS {
ACTION analyzeProblem {
GUARDS { AESELF_MANAGEMENT.SELF_HEALING.inActiveSelfHealing }
VARS { BOOLEAN failed }
DOES {
IF METRICS.numberOfFailedNodes THEN
AES.STAGE_AE.nodeToRecover =
call AEIP.MANAGED_ELEMENTS.STAGE_ME.getFailedNode;
failed = TRUE
END
ELSE
AES.STAGE_AE.nodeToRecover =
call AEIP.MANAGED_ELEMENTS.STAGE_ME.getProblematicNode;
failed = FALSE
END
}
TRIGGERS {
IF failed THEN EVENTS.mustSwitchToNodeReplica END
ELSE EVENTS.mustFixNode END
}
ONERR_TRIGGERS { EVENTS.selfHealingFailed }
}
ACTION startReplicaNode {
GUARDS { AESELF_MANAGEMENT.SELF_HEALING.inFailedNodesDetected }
DOES {
call AEIP.MANAGED_ELEMENTS.STAGE_ME.runNodeReplica(AES.STAGE_AE.nodeToRecover) }
TRIGGERS { EVENTS.nodeReplicaStarted }
}
ACTION fixProblematicNode {
GUARDS { AESELF_MANAGEMENT.SELF_HEALING.inProblematicNodesDetected }
DOES {
call AEIP.MANAGED_ELEMENTS.STAGE_ME.recoverNode(AES.STAGE_AE.nodeToRecover) }
TRIGGERS { EVENTS.nodeFixed}
}
} // ACTIONS
EVENTS {
EVENT mustDoSelfHealing { }
EVENT selfHealingSuccessful {
ACTIVATION {
OCCURRED { EVENTS.nodeReplicaStarted }
OR
OCCURRED { EVENTS.nodeFixed }
}
}
EVENT selfHealingFailed {
ACTIVATION {
OCCURRED { EVENTS.nodeReplicaFailed }
}
}
EVENT mustSwitchToNodeReplica {....}
EVENT nodeReplicaStarted { }
EVENT nodeReplicaFailed { }
EVENT mustFixNode { }
EVENT nodeFixed { }
EVENT nodeCannotBeFixed { }
} // EVENTS
METRICS {
// increments when a failed node has been discovered
METRIC numberOfFailedNodes {
METRIC_TYPE { RESOURCE }
METRIC_SOURCE { AEIP.MANAGED_ELEMENTS.STAGE_ME.countFailedNodes }
DESCRIPTION {"counts failed nodes in the MARF stage"}
VALUE { 0 }
THRESHOLD_CLASS { Integer [0] } // valid only when holding 0 value
}
// increments when a problematic node has been discovered
METRIC numberOfProblematicNodes {
METRIC_TYPE { RESOURCE }
METRIC_SOURCE { AEIP.MANAGED_ELEMENTS.STAGE_ME.countProblematicNodes }
DESCRIPTION {"counts nodes with problems in the MARF stage"}
VALUE { 0 }
THRESHOLD_CLASS { Integer [0] } // valid only when holding 0 value
}
}
}
}
B ASSL Code Specification for DMARF
Self-Protection
// ASSL self-protecting specification model for DMARF
AS DMARF {
TYPES { ProxyCertificate }
ASSELF_MANAGEMENT {
// if a private message is detected as being insecure then
// ignore it - the AE cannot neither receive nor resend it
SELF_PROTECTING {....}
} // ASSELF_MANAGEMENT
ACTIONS {
ACTION checkPublicMessage {
GUARDS { ASSELF_MANAGEMENT.SELF_PROTECTING.inSecurityCheck }
VARS { Boolean senderIdentified }
DOES {
senderIdentified = false;
FOREACH member in AES {
IF ( NOT senderIdentified ) THEN
senderIdentified =
call member.ACTIONS.checkSenderCertificate
(ASIP.MESSAGES.publicMessage.senderSignature)
END
};
IF NOT senderIdentified THEN
// makes the metric invalid and thus, triggers the attached event
// and blocks all the operations with public messages
set METRICS.thereIsInsecurePublicMessage.VALUE = true
END
ELSE
// makes the metric valid and thus, triggers the attached event
// and unblocks all the operations with public messages
set METRICS.thereIsInsecurePublicMessage.VALUE = false
END
}
ONERR_DOES {
// if error then treat the message as insecure
set METRICS.thereIsInsecurePublicMessage.VALUE = true
}
}
} // ACTIONS
EVENTS { // these events are used in the fluents specification
EVENT publicMessageIsComing {....}
EVENT publicMessageInsecure {....}
EVENT publicMessageSecure {....}
} // EVENTS
METRICS {
// set to true when a new public insecure message
// has been discovered
METRIC thereIsInsecurePublicMessage {
METRIC_TYPE { QUALITY }
DESCRIPTION {"detects an insecure message in the AE"}
VALUE { false }
// valid only when holding false value
THRESHOLD_CLASS { Boolean [false] }
}
}
} // AS DMARF
ASIP {
MESSAGES {
MESSAGE publicMessage {....}
}
CHANNELS {
CHANNEL publicLink {....}
}
FUNCTIONS {
//receive public messages if the message is secure
FUNCTION receivePublicMessages {....}
//send public messages if the message is secure
FUNCTION sendPublicMessages {....}
}
}
AES {
AE STAGE_AE {
AESELF_MANAGEMENT {
// if a private message is detected as being insecure then
// ignore it - the AE cannot neither receive nor resend it
SELF_PROTECTING {
FLUENT inSecurityCheck {
INITIATED_BY { EVENTS.privateMessageIsComming }
TERMINATED_BY { EVENTS.privateMessageSecure,
EVENTS.privateMessageInsecure }
}
MAPPING {
CONDITIONS { inSecurityCheck }
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DO_ACTIONS { ACTIONS.checkPrivateMessage }
}
}
} // AESELF_MANAGEMENT
AEIP {
MESSAGES {
MESSAGE privateMessage {....}
}
CHANNELS {
CHANNEL privateLink {....}
}
FUNCTIONS {
//receive private messages if the message is secure
FUNCTION receivePrivateMessages {
DOES {
IF ( AES.STAGE_AE.METRICS.thereIsInsecurePrivateMessage ) THEN
AEIP.MESSAGES.privateMessage << AEIP.CHANNELS.privateLink
END
}
}
//send private messages if the message is secure
FUNCTION sendPrivateMessages {
DOES {
IF ( AES.STAGE_AE.METRICS.thereIsInsecurePrivateMessage ) THEN
AEIP.MESSAGES.privateMessage >> AEIP.CHANNELS.privateLink
END
}
}
}
MANAGED_ELEMENTS {
MANAGED_ELEMENT STAGE_ME {....}
}
} // AEIP
ACTIONS {
ACTION checkSenderCertificate {
PARAMETERS { ProxyCertificate theCertificate }
RETURNS { Boolean }
VARS { Boolean found }
DOES {
found = call AEIP.MANAGED_ELEMENTS.STAGE_ME.checkNodeCertificate
(theCertificate);
return found
}
}
ACTION checkPrivateMessage {
GUARDS { AESELF_MANAGEMENT.SELF_PROTECTING.inSecurityCheck }
VARS { Boolean senderIdentified }
DOES {
senderIdentified = call ACTIONS.checkSenderCertificate
( AEIP.MESSAGES.privateMessage.senderSignature );
IF NOT senderIdentified THEN
// makes the metric invalid and thus, triggers the attached event
// and blocks all the operations with private messages
set METRICS.thereIsInsecurePrivateMessage.VALUE = true
END
ELSE
// makes the metric valid and thus, triggers the attached event
// and unblocks all the operations with private messages
set METRICS.thereIsInsecurePrivateMessage.VALUE = false
END
}
ONERR_DOES {
// if error then treat the message as insecure
set METRICS.thereIsInsecurePrivateMessage.VALUE = true
}
}
} // ACTIONS
EVENTS {
EVENT privateMessageIsComming {
ACTIVATION { SENT { AEIP.MESSAGES.privateMessage } }
}
EVENT privateMessageInsecure {
GUARDS { NOT METRICS.thereIsInsecurePrivateMessage }
ACTIVATION { CHANGED { METRICS.thereIsInsecurePrivateMessage } }
}
EVENT privateMessageSecure {
GUARDS { METRICS.thereIsInsecurePrivateMessage }
ACTIVATION { CHANGED { METRICS.thereIsInsecurePrivateMessage } }
}
} // EVENTS
METRICS {
// set to true when an insecure private message is discovered
METRIC thereIsInsecurePrivateMessage {
METRIC_TYPE { QUALITY }
DESCRIPTION {"detects an insecure message in the AE"}
VALUE { false }
// valid only when holding false value
THRESHOLD_CLASS { Boolean [false] }
}
}
}
}
C ASSL Code Specification for DMARF
Self-Optimization
// ASSL self-optimization specification model for DMARF
AS DMARF {
ASSELF_MANAGEMENT {
// DMARF strives to optimize by synchronizing cached
// results before starting with the Classification Stage
SELF_OPTIMIZING {....}
} // ASSELF_MANAGEMENT
ASARCHITECTURE {....}
ACTIONS {
ACTION runGlobalOptimization {
GUARDS { ASSELF_MANAGEMENT.SELF_OPTIMIZING.inClassificationStage }
DOES {
FOREACH member IN ASARCHITECTURE.GROUPS.CLASSF_STAGE.MEMBERS {
call IMPL member.ACTIONS.synchronizeResults
}
}
TRIGGERS {
EVENTS.optimizationSucceeded
}
ONERR_TRIGGERS {
// if error then report unsuccessful optimization
EVENTS.optimizationNotSucceeded
}
}
} // ACTIONS
EVENTS { // these events are used in the fluents specification
EVENT enteringClassificationStage { }
EVENT optimizationSucceeded { }
EVENT optimizationNotSucceeded { }
} // EVENTS
} // AS DMARF
AES {
AE CLASSF_STAGE_NODE_1 {
AESELF_MANAGEMENT {
SELF_OPTIMIZING {
FLUENT inCPAdaptation {
INITIATED_BY { AS.EVENTS.enteringClassificationStage }
TERMINATED_BY { EVENTS.cpAdaptationSucceeded,
EVENTS.cpAdaptationNotSucceeded }
}
MAPPING {
CONDITIONS { inCPAdaptation }
DO_ACTIONS { ACTIONS.adaptCP }
}
}
}
ACTIONS {
ACTION IMPL synchronizeResults {
GUARDS { AS.ASSELF_MANAGEMENT.SELF_OPTIMIZING.
inClassificationStage
}
}
ACTION IMPL adaptCP {
GUARDS { AESELF_MANAGEMENT.SELF_OPTIMIZING.inCPAdaptation }
TRIGGERS { EVENTS.cpAdaptationSucceeded }
ONERR_TRIGGERS { EVENTS.cpAdaptationNotSucceeded }
}
} // ACTIONS
EVENTS { // these events are used in the fluents specification
EVENT cpAdaptationSucceeded { }
EVENT cpAdaptationNotSucceeded { }
} // EVENTS
}
AE CLASSF_STAGE_NODE_2 {
AESELF_MANAGEMENT {
SELF_OPTIMIZING {
FLUENT inCPAdaptation {
INITIATED_BY { AS.EVENTS.enteringClassificationStage }
TERMINATED_BY { EVENTS.cpAdaptationSucceeded,
EVENTS.cpAdaptationNotSucceeded }
}
MAPPING {
CONDITIONS { inCPAdaptation }
DO_ACTIONS { ACTIONS.adaptCP }
}
}
}
ACTIONS {
ACTION IMPL synchronizeResults {
GUARDS { AS.ASSELF_MANAGEMENT.SELF_OPTIMIZING.
inClassificationStage
}
}
ACTION IMPL adaptCP {
GUARDS { AESELF_MANAGEMENT.SELF_OPTIMIZING.inCPAdaptation }
TRIGGERS { EVENTS.cpAdaptationSucceeded }
ONERR_TRIGGERS { EVENTS.cpAdaptationNotSucceeded }
}
} // ACTIONS
EVENTS { // these events are used in the fluents specification
EVENT cpAdaptationSucceeded { }
EVENT cpAdaptationNotSucceeded { }
} // EVENTS}
}
}
